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ARTICLES
THE CONCEPT OF SECURITIES
MANIPULATION AND ITS FOUNDATIONS
IN FRANCE AND THE USAt
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Odile Simart"
ABSTRACT
Except in the United States, the crackdown on securities
manipulation remains the "black sheep" of the penal financial
law. This article analyzes the differences between the Ameri-
can and French concepts of securities manipulation and the
divergent doctrines they have spawned. In light of the enact-
ment of the July 2, 1996 law [in France] which established
and modified the penal nature of the infraction, the article
inquires into the appropriateness of maintaining a dual penal
and administrative penalty.
In the last couple of years, penal financial law was princi-
pally concerned with insider trading, and starting with the
United States, most industrialized countries have put in place
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some form of legislation on the subject' on account of the prin-
ciple of "reputation."2
Today, a fair repression of insider trading is assured
through satisfactory rules of law, and regulatory authorities
have shifted their focus to other practices such as securities
manipulation, particularly the boiler' variant. While there is
legislation and a copious jurisprudence to penalize insider
trading, it must be noted that, except in the United States, the
crackdown on securities manipulation remains the "black
sheep" of the penal financial law. The numerous financial
scandals in the United States in the late 1980s gave rise to an
abundant anti-manipulation jurisprudence that was widely dis-
cussed.4 More generally, the crash of 1987 gave rise to a two-
pronged inquiry into certain practices in the market: on the
one hand, were these practices partly at the origin of the disas-
ter, or did they at least contribute to the heavy fall in the
market, and on the other hand, could some of these practices
be considered manipulative?
The purpose of this article is to analyze the principles that
govern the infraction of securities manipulation within the
American and French systems (manipulations of commodities
will not be examined in this study).5 There is not enough room
in this presentation to study certain financial practices that
would fall under the scope of this legislation were they not
protected by some legal exemption; such is the case with the
1. For an analysis of the various legislation, see E. GAILIARD, INSIDER TRAD-
ING: THE LAWS OF EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN (Kluwer Law & Taxa-
tion Publishers, Deventer, 1993).
2. Hubert de Vauplane, Protection de 'gpargne et concurrence de places,
BANQU E'T DROrr, No. 41, May-Jume 1995, at 37.
3. Cf. Working Group Report of the XVIII Conference of OICV, Bull. COB,
1993, No. 275.
4. Consider the examples of Michael Milken, Drexel Burnham Lambert, Ivan
Boesky, Dennis Levine, Boyd Jefferies, GAF Corporation, Salim "Sandy" Lewis,
Paul Bilzerian, etc. For a global perspective on these different types of manipula-
tion, see A.F. Mathews et al., Manipulative Practices: Past, Present and Future, in
TRADING PRACTICES, THE PORTFOLIO EXECUTION PROCESS, AND SOFT DOLLAR PRAC-
TICES 1990 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 1990).
5. Commodities manipulation will not be discussed even though the French
penal infraction originally targeted commodities and not securities. For a more
detailed study of the manipulation of securities in commercial markets, see Jerry
W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Future Prices: The Unprosecutable
Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281 (1991), which, in light of the professionals' failure
to stop all manipulative practices, calls for a reinforcement of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission's powers.
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stabilization of a stock after it has just been offered in the
market.
Although the objectives sought are identical in both coun-
tries, it soon becomes apparent that the foundations of this
repression are not the same on both sides of the Atlantic. In
France, until the last reform effected by Law No. 96-597 of
July 2, 1996 with respect to the modernization of financial
activities, the foundation of the penal infraction was essential-
ly moral, where in the United States, only a violation of the
principles of market economy constitutes the foundation of the
offense. One should also note a great difference in the effec-
tiveness of the legislation in combating these practices, the
American regulation being better adapted than its French
counterpart. Although the relative size of either of these stock
markets partly explains this observation, it remains more
fundamentally true that among the constituent elements of the
infraction in France, there existed a strong moral component
that posed a hindrance to prosecution. On the other hand,
American legislators tend to multiply infractions, thereby
weakening the importance of the intent element. Finally, ab-
sent an integration of the financial theory of fraud-on-the-mar-
ket, French magistrates, unlike their American counterparts,
face great difficulties in characterizing the damages. All these
elements no doubt explain the fewer number of cases in France
as opposed to abundant jurisprudence on the subject in Ameri-
ca.
In France, the reform of financial infractions under the
above-cited law falls within a trend that seeks to minimize the
moral component of the infractions.6 However, the New Penal
Code tends to exclude objective or material infractions. While
one may have no option other than to subscribe to this per-
spective with respect to securities manipulation, one must be
reticent to do so with respect to insider trading. In fact, an
examination of the respective foundations of insider trading
and securities manipulation leads to the conclusion that the
latter is an intrinsic economic infraction, while the former is
6. The modifications in the phrasing of these infractions seek to incriminate
behavior rather than persons. The most important changes achieved by this reform
are the exclusion, with respect to insider infractions, of communication of privi-
leged information, dissemination of false information, and reference to the "mar-
ket."
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more moral in nature. This observation is coupled with an
inquiry into the effectiveness of the French regulation: Would
it not have been preferable, on account of a better effectiveness
of norms, to decriminalize securities manipulation and allow
the Commission des Operations de Bourse (COB) exclusive
competence on the subject?
We will first study the history and foundations of the in-
fraction (Part I) before attempting to give a definition of the
concept of securities manipulation (Part II). Such an approach
will permit an examination of the constituent elements of the
infraction (Part III). Finally, it would be appropriate to inquire
into the effectiveness of the rule (Part IV).
I. HISTORY AND FOUNDATIONS OF THE INFRACTION
While the prohibition of stock manipulation is older in
France than it is in the United States (Section A), it appears
from the outset that the foundations of the prohibition are
divergent on both sides of the Atlantic (Section B).
A. An Infraction that is Older in France than it is in the
United States
If Americans were the first to reprimand insider practices,
it was the English7 and the French who first addressed the
harmful influences of manipulation of commodities and finan-
cial stock markets.
1. A Genesis of the Infraction
It is well known that the first securities manipulation case
was adjudicated in England in 1814 in the matter of Rex v. de
Berenger.' Subsequent to a rumor about Napoleon's death,
stock values in London rose astronomically, and later collapsed
when the rumor turned out to be unfounded. Berenger and
some friends seized the occasion to sell all their holdings and
thus realized substantial profits. The court condemned this
practice, holding that the public had a right to a natural and
7. For a comparative study of securities manipulation in Great Britain and
the United States, see How Chih Lee, Market Manipulation in the US and UK,
COM~4PANY LAW., vol. 14, No. 5, May 1993, at 84 and No. 7, July 1993, at 123.
8. Rex v. de Berenger, 3 Maule & S. 67, 70, 105 Eng. Rep. 536, 537 (K.B.
1814).
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free market, and that it was not necessary to show a detriment
to the state or a profit realized by the defendants. In 1892,
English jurisprudence indicated that no distinction could be
made between manipulation resulting from divulging false
information and manipulation carried out by means of false
and fictitious acts.9 These two decisions established the free-
and-open-public market doctrine.
In France, the history of securities manipulation is linked
to that of speculation. From the Revolution to our times, the
notion of speculation, and the distinction between its licit and
illicit forms, have undergone a slow evolution. The old law,' °
or even the intermediate law, often tended to confuse it with
agiotage," which Mirabeau defined as "the use of the least
delicate maneuvers to produce unexpected variations in prices
of public stocks to profit from the misfortune of those one has
deceived." 2 The drafters of the Penal Code of 1810 did not
have a precise idea of the issue, and were only concerned with
combating collusion and acquisitions. 3 In their original drafts,
articles 419 to 422 of the Penal Code targeted agiotage. But
while these articles penalized the infraction of price alteration
or collusion-sometimes also called illicit actions on the mar-
ket, or illicit speculation-these texts were not applicable to
stock market transactions, even though the initial project an-
ticipated them.14 Thus, article 419 penalized only hikes or
drops in commodities, merchandise, or public titles, but was
9. Scott v. Brown, Doering, McNab & Co., [1892] 2 Q.B. 724, 730 (CA),
cited in LoUIs LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION ch. 10, at 3946
(3d ed. 1992).
10. For a historical study since antiquity, see Martin, La Speculation Ilicite,
Dijon Thesis 1922, at 13 et seq.
11. For a study of agiotage and acquisition, see TCHERNOFF, TRAITA DE DROrI
PtNAL FINANCIER (1931); L. Mazeaud, Le ddlit d'altdration des prix, REC. D. IV
145 (1927); more recently, see E. Thiveau, L'agiotage sous Necker et Calonne and
L'agiotage sous la rivolutibn, in LES MARCH2S FINANCIERS FRAN(QAIS: UNE PERSPEC-
TIVE HISTORIQUE (Association d'economie financibre, 1994).
12. Diderot defined agiotage as "the commerce of one who, for whatever profit,
converts bills, promises, or contracts into money, who deals in stocks, who accords
such values to all commercial instruments with the hope of deriving some profit."
ENCYCLOPADIE OU DICTIONNAIRE RAISONNt DES SCIENCES, DES ARTS ET DES MftIERS
636 T. I (1777).
13. Plachte, La Speculation illicite sur le marchg financier, Thesis, Paris 1933,
at 3.
14. For an analysis of the provisions of article 419, see C. Ducouloux-Favard,
DROIT P tNAL DES AFFAIRES 129 (Masson, 1st ed. 1987).
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not applicable to securities, a fact which the Cassation Court
confirmed in 1885.15 It was not until the Law of December 3,
1926 that private stocks were added to the list of items target-
ed by article 419, and the constituent elements of the infrac-
tion were somehow modified (namely, a mere attempt became
punishable). The Order on Prices of December 1, 1986 inadver-
tently abrogated article 419-2. However, Law No. 88-70 of
January 22, 1988 concerning stock values corrected this legis-
lative procedural error; securities manipulation became a spe-
cific stock law infraction under article 10-3 of Order No. 67-833
of September 28, 1967.
Thus, in France, securities manipulation is an old concept
inherited from illicit speculation, which later evolved to specifi-
cally adapt to the stock market. Since Law No. 89-531 of Au-
gust 2, 1989, securities manipulation may also be penalized as
a violation of rule No. 90-04 of the COB. This duality of repres-
sive authorities gives rise to a duality of qualification: correc-
tional infraction and/or COB violation, even though they each
have different constituent elements. Moreover, this does not
mean that a substantial manipulation constitutes an infraction
while a less serious manipulation constitutes a COB viola-
tion." Finally, as we will soon see, the last reform effected by
Law No. 96-597 of July 2, 1996 has modified the intent ele-
ment of article 10-3.
2. A Late Beginning in the United States
Although more recent, the American legislation on the
subject of manipulation has some older roots that are traceable
to the influence of English jurisprudence. In fact the United
States has also adopted the free-and-open market theory, but
this did not take place until the 1920s. At common law, every
form of manipulation was deemed fraudulent: simultaneous
purchases and sales, false information, and "corner."7 The
two major financial statutes were enacted in 1933 (Securities
Act) and 1934 (Securities Exchange Act) subsequent to the
financial crash of 1929. The first one deals in general with the
15. Chambre criminelle [Cass. crim.] June 30, 1885, D.P. 1886.1.389.
16. But see Y. GUYON, ASPECTS JURIDIQUES DE LA MANIPULATION DE COURS:
RAPPORT MORAL SUR L'ARGENT DANS LE MONDE 87 (P.A.U. ed., 1995).
17. A corner is the purchase of a stock at a higher price in order to compel
term sellers to execute their stocks at the buyer's price.
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issuance of securities while the second one sets the judicial
framework for the operations of registered and unregistered
secondary markets. Of the two, the 1934 legislation is the more
important: It has numerous provisions to combat various forms
of manipulation, and, more important, it seeks to achieve full
disclosure in the market through the elimination of manipula-
tion. Since Congress empowered the SEC to regulate this type
of practice (article 10(b)), a number of SEC regulations are
based on this legislation (rules 10b-1 to 10b-21).
B. A Different Philosophy Linked to Speculation in Each
Country
In the United States, the 1934 Act was a response to the
anxiety of a public convinced that stock market activities deep-
ly affected the economic well-being of the country. There was a
general consensus that speculative activities in the market and
the attendant manipulations contributed significantly to the
crash of 1929 and the Great Depression." A legislation that
would reduce speculation without necessarily destroying the
market was required. Manipulation, a fraudulent form of spec-
ulation, 9 became the focal point of the problem, and the es-
sential justification for the evocation of federal intervention.
The intent of the legislation was to protect the investor against
deceptive practices that artificially affected the market and
impaired the normal interplay of supply and demand."
In France, it would seem at first glance that the legislation
adopted a similar approach: a desire for transparency and
integrity of the market, and a desire to control the harmful
18. It is interesting to note that the 1934 legislation expressly states in sec-
tion 2(4) that the purpose of the federal legislation was that:
National emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the
dislocation of trade, transportation, and industry, and which burden inter-
state commerce and adversely affect the general welfare, are precipitated,
intensified, and prolonged by manipulation and sudden and unreasonable
fluctuations of security prices and by excessive speculation on such ex-
changes and markets ....
Securities Exchange Act § 2(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78b(2)(4) (1994). For more on the
motivations for the 1933 and 1934 legislation, see A.A. Berle, Jr., Stock Market
Manipulation, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 393 (1938).
19. Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 394 (1990).
20. William R. McLucas & Alma M. Angotti, Market Manipulation, 22 REV.
SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 103 (1989).
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effects of speculation-was the infraction not rooted in illicit
speculation? In fact, it goes beyond that. The law in France
particularly seeks to moralize the market. Illicit activities not
only injure the interests of investors, they also allow unjusti-
fied profits at the expense of all participants.21 The moral as-
pect was, therefore, strongly emphasized in the legal definition
of this infraction. Nevertheless, the new definition of the in-
fraction modifies the import of the intent element.
The American approach is more economic in nature: the
infraction was created in reaction to an economic crisis, and
with the view to obtain a true interaction of supply and de-
mand. On the other hand, the French approach is more moral-
istic: to prevent others from obtaining unjustified gains and to
restore balance and equity in the distribution of profits. This
great difference probably accounts for the near absence of
French jurisprudence on the subject. To our knowledge, there
are only two judicial decisions on the subject, one about a
merger22 and the other on the so called "boiler" practice,23
whereas across the Atlantic, there are numerous decisions. Is
it not easier to prove economic facts than it is to prove a moral
intent?
1. Securities Manipulation and Its Impact on the Social and
Moral Order
The links between law and morality have never been as
divergent in the past as they are today. This observation is
particularly pertinent to speculation.
a. Manipulation-Speculation Links
The notion of manipulation is fundamentally linked to that
of speculation. It invokes a form of illicit speculation. What
then is an illicit speculation? How do we distinguish it from a
licit one? Our understanding of speculation is radically differ-
21. Oh. Freyria, Les aspects r~pressifs de la r~glementation boursi&e actuelle,
REVUE DE DROIT BANCAiRE ET DE LA BOURSE, No. 8, July-Aug. 1988, at 113.
22. Tribunaux de grande instance [T.G.I.] Paris, Mar. 5, 1993, RJDA 10/93
No. 813; BANQUE ET DROIT No. 31, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 23 note Peltier.
23. T.G.I. Paris, Mar. 14, 1990, Gazette du Palais [Gaz. Pal.] June 21, 1990,
at 335 note J.P. Marchi; RTDCOM. 1990, at 662; Bulletin Joly [Bull. Joly] 1990, at
777, sec. 231. On appeal, Paris, Feb. 19, 1991, Droit penal, July 1991 No. 202
note J.H. Robert.
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ent on either side of the Atlantic.
In France, and until recently, speculation had always
received bad press. Thaller defined it broadly as "the idea of
enrichment or lucre directed toward values which one influenc-
es."' Although it is still occasionally perceived as facilitating
"easy money," our attachment to capitalism, a market econo-
my, and competition has triumphed over the negative connota-
tion it stills evokes.' Our attitude remains, nonetheless, am-
biguous; speculation sometimes arises in the context of "a
financial maneuver for a productive investment, and at other
times, in the context of dishonest activities to obtain illegiti-
mate gains."26 This ambiguity is even reflected in our judicial
system; it is either a threat to economic stability, or a catalyst
of the market. Thus, the concept of manipulation does little
more than add to the confusion. In fact, manipulation appears
as an abuse of the speculative phenomenon; an abuse mani-
fested through disloyal and dishonest maneuvers."
In the United States, on the other hand, manipulation
seems more independent of speculation. The latter is consid-
ered a normal practice. Although federal financial law de-
nounced the harmful consequences of speculation as the cata-
lyst of the crash of 1929, the legislation seeks primarily to
regulate all practices that tend to disrupt the market and the
free interplay of supply and demand."
Certainly, on either side of the Atlantic, practices that
tend to incorporate active (dolosives) maneuvers cannot be
likened to speculation.
24. Thaller & Percerou, Traitd de droit commercial, 7th ed., No. 14.
25. Ripert, Aspects juridiques du capitalism moderne, LDGJ 1951, at 163 et
seq.
26. D. Pontn-Grillet, La speculation en droit privd, D. 1990, ch. 157.
27. This distinction between manipulation and speculation is emphasized in
the Paris Court of Appeal decision of June 28, 1984 (Gaz. Pal. Oct. 23, 1984, at
649): "To qualify an intervention on the stock market as normal or abnormal is
beyond any objective criteria once the sales and purchases took place at applicable
rates. Speculation, or even random speculation, is not in itself an infraction, except
in the specific instance of securities manipulation."
28. Thel, supra note 19, at 393.
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b. Penalizing Immoral or Illegal Conduct
The media coverage received by some manipulation cases,
especially in the United States, has uncovered the inequality
between seasoned investors who are knowledgeable of invest-
ment techniques (both legal and illegal ones) and the average
investors. As is the case with insider trading, the attitudes are
ambiguous: everyone dislikes manipulation, but everyone
would like to benefit from it. Society in general is also shocked
at the impunity with which the manipulator acts. In fact, the
speculator knows that his activity is likely to alter the regular
functioning of the market. But he does not know if his inter-
vention will be enough to bring about a hike or a drop. In
other words, he runs a risk in light of the indeterminate na-
ture of his intervention. His profit is thus a result of the risk
taken. On the other hand, the manipulator, just like the inside
trader, eliminates the element of risk since he creates his own
financial environment. His profit therefore seems abnormal,
resulting neither from financial analysis nor from the free
interplay of supply and demand (the manipulator himself arti-
ficially modified the supply or demand of the stock).
Nevertheless, one would be hard pressed to perceive stock
manipulation as essentially immoral conduct; in other words,
as conduct contrary to the goodness of the end, the means, and
the circumstances. The imposition of a penalty for this practice
appears more, to use an expression dear to Durkeim, as the
expression of society's indignation. Rather than aiming at
morality, the repression of securities manipulation appears
more like a simple economic effectiveness measure.
c. Penalizing Conduct Contrary to the Integrity of the Market
The consolidation of markets has accentuated competition
between financial markets, and the transparency and integrity
of a market are factors that determine its competitiveness.
Securities manipulation affects the transparency of a mar-
ket " and therefore equal access to information. The imbalance
of information and the artificial creation of supply or demand,
which are both principal characteristics of securities manipula-
tion, thus constitute a prejudice to the principle of equality."0
29. de Vauplane, supra note 2, at 37.
30. Pour une dthique des marchds financiers, BANQUE No. 502, Feb. 1990, at
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But beyond equality between investors and respect for
supply and demand, securities manipulation more importantly
affects confidence. Confidence is a state of mind that deter-
mines the conduct of buyers and sellers. Financiers observe it
keenly, attempt to stabilize it, or even to reinstate it when it
disappears.3 This confidence, which is ensured through trans-
parency, can only be sustained if investors have faith in the
institutions and the rules. If participants lose confidence in the
market, they are disinclined to invest in it; the market is then
discredited, and it loses all attraction. Americans speak of a
policy of full disclosure and truth telling. All bad faith and
dishonest practices must therefore disappear from the market
in order to make its agents more dependable."
2. Securities Manipulation and Its Effects on the Free
Interplay of Supply and Demand
In addition to its effects on a market's integrity, securities
manipulation is first and foremost conduct that is contrary to a
market economy. This becomes manifest from the permeation
of the American financial jurisprudence with economic and
financial theory." In fact, one of the most important judicial
applications of economic research undoubtedly derives from the
theory of market efficiency which postulates that real prices of
active stocks must correspond to their theoretical values. 4
This theory underlies the fraud-on-the-market theory.
a. Effects on Market Efficiency and the Fraud-on-the-Market
Theory
For economists, the primary purpose of a financial market
is to provide signposts that permit the distribution of resources
among different participants in the market. It is therefore
130.
31. J. Birouste, Anthropologie de la confiance, in RAPPORT MORAL SUR
L'ARGENT DANS LE MONDE (1994).
32. J.M. Servet, Histoire d'un mot, in RAPPORT MORAL SUR L'ARGENT DANS
LE MONDE (1994).
33. Mark L. Mitchell & Jeffrey M. Netter, The Role of Financial Economics in
Securities Fraud Cases: Applications at the Securities and Exchange Commission,
49 BUS. LAW. 545 (1994).
34. Rainier J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Effi-
ciency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
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important that stock capitalization provides at all times the
best possible evaluation of a company's worth. To this end,
the market must integrate information with respect to assets
and transform it into a price which ultimately will determine
the equilibrium between supply and demand. Speculation thus
plays a preponderant role, since it facilitates this equilibrium
by allowing for a better circulation of information among par-
ticipants, and, in the process, helping to stabilize the mar-
ket. 5 In that sense, speculation contributes to market efficien-
cy.
Since the time of Eugene Fama, it is also known that the
market efficiency theory considers prices of active stocks to be
perfectly reflective of all available information. These prices
thus undergo a "random walk." 6 This means that whatever
information is likely to affect a stock is completely and instan-
taneously reflected in the stock, and the current price of the
stock represents the expectation of future prices subject to the
information and its being identically available to all agents. At
all times in this efficient market, available information is re-
flected in the price of the active stock, and this in turn always
provides a good estimate of its intrinsic value.
The difficulty resides then in the determination of this
intrinsic value. Fama indicated that in an efficient market, the
combined actions of all operators cause the real price to fluc-
tuate in an indeterminate way about its intrinsic value. Conse-
quently, the more the number of informed agents, the greater
efficient the market will be, and the more likely it is to evolve
along the lines of an ideal market where prices of active stocks
undergo a random walk. In this model, information is essential
to the theoretical construct. That is why it is also referred to
as informational efficiency. It may take on three forms: weak,
semi-strong, and strong.37 This theory of efficiency thus opens
up new ways of articulating financial theory around informa-
tion. Moreover, it demonstrates the key role information plays
in the functioning of stock markets.
35. J.F. Rouge, La spdculation: r~gles du jeu, PA 6 Aug. 1993, No. 94, at 16;
Hubert de Vauplane & J.P. Bornet, Droit de la Bourse, LITEC, at 178.
36. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Em-
pirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).
37. Hubert de Vauplane & C. Denoun, Les justifications de la lutte pdnale
contre les opirations d'initids, PA 28 No. 37, Mar. 1994, at 4.
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It is now conceivable how securities manipulation adverse-
ly affects market efficiency. In fact, according to Pareto's
optimality theory," every agent supposedly ameliorates the
global state of the economy by having access to perfect infor-
mation. In a manipulated environment, however, information
is not perfect because it is distorted (artificially created by one
or more manipulators). This market inefficiency is also rein-
forced by the imbalance of information (equality of information
is nonexistent since some investors, namely the manipulators,
have access to information unknown to others). In other words,
the information on which the other investors supposedly rely
has been truncated by the manipulators. Where there is imbal-
ance of information, it is possible that some "ill-informed"
agents will anticipate based on subjective, psychological crite-
ria rather than objective, albeit unobservable, market criteria.
Such a situation leads everyone to imitate everyone else. It
may also induce operators to behave irrationally, thereby caus-
ing speculative bubbles that may give rise to financial cri-
ses.39 Consequently, manipulation may be likened to short-
term speculation, and a short term speculative market is ineffi-
cient.4 °
Thus, strictly from an economic perspective, securities
manipulation affects market efficiency. However, this is not
necessarily so for insider trading.
In the United States, this economic theory has been trans-
posed into the judiciary through the fraud-on-the-market theo-
ry. Traditionally, the plaintiff alleging fraud had to show that
he had studied the misleading financial reports and that he
substantially relied on them for his decision. But since most
investors do not study financial reports, they had their cases
dismissed. The courts' attitude began to change in the mid-
1970s when the effects on market efficiency were invoked.4'
38. Vilfredo Frederico Pareto (1848-1923). Pareto's optimum refers to the
optimum common to producers and consumers, which in a competitive environment
will not improve the condition of one of them without detriment to another.
39. J. Bouvier, La deficience des marches efficients, BANQUE, No. 497, Sept.
1989, at 827. For a deeper coverage of financial euphoria and market irrationality,
see CH.P. KINDLEBERGER, HISTOIRE MONDIALE DE LA SPECULATION FINANCIkRE DE
1700 A NOS JOURS (P.A.U. ed., 1995).
40. Kenneth A. Froot et al., Herd on the street: Informational Efficiencies in a
Market with Short-term Speculation, 47 J. FIN. 1461 (1992).
41. Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damag-
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Thus, in the matters of Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States
and Mills v. Electric Auto-tite Co., the court recognized the
existence of a presumption of reliance when there is non disclo-
sure or omission of a material fact.42 Federal courts broadened
this presumption to apply to misrepresentation and also de-
clared that the presumption was rebuttable.
In the matter of Chris-Craft Industries v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., the Second Circuit adopted the fraud-on-the-market
theory, where the investor may depend on the integrity of the
market when he buys or sells stocks. The court also admitted
that the theory may be applicable where the fraudulent con-
duct was not directly attributable to the seller. In Blackie v.
Barrack, the Ninth Circuit held that this presumption could be
overcome by showing that the investor based his decision pri-
marily on some source other than the integrity of the market.
Although the primary reliance test was not applied in Panzerer
v. Wolf, the fraud-on-the-market theory was retained in the
1988 Supreme Court decision of Basic v. Levinson."3
The fraud-on-the-market theory derives from the market
efficiency theory, since it relies on the principle that the inves-
tor may rely on the market price of a stock as reflective of its
true value. Consequently, any deceptive statement that alters
the price is fraudulent, even if the average investor was not
aware of it. However, the adoption of this theory by the courts
has sometimes been criticized by American doctrine. First,
some have deplored the fact that it was not supported by copy-
right law with respect to a company's information. Some writ-
ers have argued that the fraud-on-the-market theory should
apply only if the defendant, especially the director of the issu-
ing company, owes the plaintiff a fiduciary duty to disclose."
In our opinion, this criticism is justified only when the infor-
mation is private, or when it applies to insider trading. But as
far as manipulation is concerned, this fiduciary duty does not
exist, since the manipulator is not necessarily the seller.
Moreover, several studies have shown that the Supreme
es: A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REv. 7 (1994).
42. Joseph De Simone, Should Fraud on the Market Theory Extend to the
Context of Newly Issued Securities?, 61 FORDHAMi L. REV. S151 (1993).
43. See id.; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Eco-
nomics: An Analysis of The Fraud-On-The Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059
(1990).
44. Macey & Miller, supra note 43, at 1059.
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Court adopted the semi-strong version of efficiency.45 Conse-
quently, it is appropriate to limit the application of this theory
to semi-strong markets. Furthermore, since this semi-strong
efficiency needs to be proved, everything will depend on the
adopted test. Another difficulty, as pointed out by some writ-
ers, lies in the fact that the price of a stock is not necessarily
uniformly efficient (some information may be more costly), and
the market is not necessarily uniformly efficient with respect
to a given stock.4" It is thus proper to limit the application of
this theory to efficient markets; it should not apply for exam-
ple, to cases involving manipulation of newly issued stocks.
b. Effects on Stock Formation
We have already seen that the principal characteristic of
financial markets is their ability to integrate information di-
rectly and transform it into price. This operates to homogenize
different parameters, thus providing the "fairest" value of the
stock. Moreover, this price determines the equilibrium between
the supply and the demand of a stock. Thus, speculation has a
stabilizing effect on the market. But securities manipulation
disrupts this equilibrium. In fact, the constituent element of
the infraction of securities manipulation, both in the United
States and in France, is the modification of a stock by disrupt-
ing the normal functioning of the market. Thus, price fixing is
no longer pertinent since the price is already falsified. More-
over, manipulation disrupts the equilibrium between supply
and demand since it creates its own demand by misleading
others through an artificially created supply. In reality, the
manipulator sends out false signals and compels other inves-
tors to react based on information that will eventually prove
false. The information imbalance thus gives rise to speculation
over a price that is inefficient. Manipulation is thus synony-
mous with destabilizing speculation. As a matter of fact, it is
for this reason that legislators tend to regulate stock stabiliza-
tion practices strictly in order to prevent artificial prices.47
45. De Simone, supra note 42, at S151; Macey & Miller, supra note 43, at
1059.
46. Macey & Miller, supra note 43, at 1059.
47. See, namely, J. Thibaud & S. Duroux, La stabilisation de cours en pdriode
d 'mission, MTF, 1992, No. 46, at 50.
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Not only does speculation affect the aptness of a market, it
also disrupts its liquidity. In fact, it would seem that absent a
balance of information, term contracts and derivatives are
more susceptible to manipulation than the underlying active
stocks.4"
In France, without the integration of the financial theory
of fraud-on-the-market, courts have difficulty characterizing
the adverse impact on the natural interplay of supply and
demand. Thus, even though the decision was rendered under
the old article 419-2 of the Penal Code, the Paris Court of
Appeal in a June 28, 1984 decision held that to characterize an
intervention on the market as normal or abnormal is beyond
any objective criteria once the transactions were carried out at
the applicable rates. Consequently, a massive intervention on
the market is not intrinsically suspicious.49
The condemnation of manipulation is thus apparently
based on objective criteria rather than moral ones. In that
light, the penal repression seems excessive. Only a decrimi-
nalization (for the adoption of an administrative repression)
would reconcile the condemnation with the foundations that
justify it.
II. A TENTATiVE DEFINITION OF SECURITIES MANIPULATION
Being a purely economic infraction, the concept of securi-
ties manipulation is distinct from similar concepts like fraud or
speculation (Section A). It is interesting to note that unlike in
the United States, the French legislation proposes a generic
definition of the concept of manipulation (Section B).
A. An Original Concept
Every financial regulation seeks to facilitate the proper
working of the market, and to this end, it prevents and pro-
scribes manipulation."0 But what is manipulation? Is there
just one definition of manipulation, or is it different according
48. Praveen Kumar & Duane J. Seppi, Futures Manipulation with "Cash Set-
tlement," 47 J. FIN. 1485 (1992).
49. Paris, June 28, 1984, Gaz. Pal. 1984.1.649, note J.P. Marchi.
50. American jurisprudence consistently emphasizes this goal. See, e.g., United
States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Stein, 456
F.2d 844, 850 (2d Cir. 1972).
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to markets? How do we differentiate securities manipulation
from the infraction of manipulation? In other words, does every
manipulation constitute an infraction?
In either American or French law, some uncertainty sur-
rounds the legal definition of manipulation. This confusion
arises from the fact that other infractions are closely similar to
manipulation.
1. Manipulation and Fraud
It is well known that the concept of manipulation is not
the same at common law as it is under French law. Intent is
not necessarily required. It suffices, for example, that a state-
ment be made. There is no regard to whether the statement is
true or false for it to be considered fraudulent. Due to this fact,
the distinction between manipulation and fraud in American
law is not always clear. This led to the suggestion that manip-
ulation is nothing but another type of fraud.5'
In French law, under the principle of legality, fraud is not
punishable unless some law specifically proscribes the conduct.
2. Manipulation and illicit Speculation
In France, the infraction of securities manipulation was
inherited from the older infraction of price alteration under
article 419 of the Penal Code.
Article 419-2 targeted individual or collective actions on
the market aimed at achieving abnormal profit. The old text
required a special "dol": the action on the market had to have
as a goal the realization of some gain that would not normally
result from the free interplay of supply and demand. Article
419-1 of the Penal Code, abrogated on March 1, 1994 at the
enactment of the New Penal Code, targeted the use of fraudu-
lent means. As a matter of fact, this article was coincidentally
similar to securities manipulation. However, the material ele-
ment of the infraction was rather extensive: the condemned
result consisted in artificially effectuating hikes or drops in
commodities, merchandise, or public and private stocks. Al-
though the article specifically proscribes certain practices (bids
51. Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit "Manipula-
tion" in Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 507 (1991).
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made to disrupt stock prices, oversupply, fallacious or calum-
nious allegations deliberately sowed in the public, etc.), it also
refers to "any fraudulent way and means." The infraction thus
proscribes all fraudulent conduct that falsified the free inter-
play of supply and demand. Culpable intent was therefore an
essential element of the infraction. It was often difficult to
appraise this conduct since judges had to make a distinction
between good and bad speculation. This explains the near
absence of jurisprudence on the subject. The same thing ap-
plies to securities manipulation: the legislators apparently did
not learn any lesson from the experience of article 419. In fact,
the material element of article 10-3 is redundant of that of
article 419: fallacious and calumnious allegations sowed in the
public are not different from statements or maneuvers that
tend to induce others into error. Until the reform effected by
the law of July 2, 1996, the only difference between both posi-
tions consisted in the fact that manipulation was an infraction
of commission, while illicit speculation was additionally an
omission infraction. One must therefore be pleased at the abro-
gation of article 419, which was manifestly serving the same
purpose as the infraction of securities manipulation.52
3. Manipulation and the Infraction of Dissemination of False
Information
The infraction of dissemination of false or misleading in-
formation is defined in article 10-1 sub. 3 of the 1967 Order.
The material element consists of the dissemination to the pub-
lic of false or misleading information by any way or means
whatsoever. The result is immaterial: the conduct remains
punishable even if the goal sought is not realized. It is suffi-
cient that the information be such as would affect the mar-
ket.5" Although intent to affect the market is not required, it is
nonetheless necessary to prove that the dissemination of infor-
52. Freyria, supra note 21, at 114.
53. See In re Sociitd Gingrale de Fronderie, which involved both an insider
infraction and a false information infraction. T.G.I. Paris, ch. 11, Dec. 20, 1990,
Gaz. Pal. 1991.2.461, note J.P. Marchi; on appeal, Paris, Jan. 15, 1992, Gaz. Pal.
1992.1.293, note J.P. Marchi; in Cassation, Cass. crim., Mar. 15, 1993, D. 1993, at
610 note C. Ducouloux-Favard; and on remand, Orleans, June 20, 1994, D. 1995,
at 81 note C. Ducouloux-Favard; Cass. crim, Oct. 19, 1995, Rev. soc., 1996, at 323
note B. Bouloc.
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mation is voluntary.' Thus, it is important to distinguish this
material element from the material element in article 10-3; in
both instances there is a desire to disrupt the proper function-
ing of the market in order to influence stock variations. How-
ever, unlike securities manipulation, dissemination of false
information does not entail a direct intervention on the mar-
ket. One writer appropriately described it as "manipulation of
minds."" The dissemination of false information is generally
linked to insider transactions and securities manipulation.
Would it not be more appropriate to incorporate this infraction
with articles 10-1 and 10-3 of the 1967 Order as is the case in
American law?
If it is not easy to differentiate between stock manipula-
tion and other similar concepts, it is even more difficult to give
it a unitary definition.
B. A Concept Defined Only in France
While French legislators have precisely regulated securi-
ties manipulation, the United States has adopted a more global
approach. In fact, across the Atlantic, there is no securities
manipulation infraction. Instead, they have a regulation for
manipulative financial practices.56 This constitutes an essen-
tial difference between both legislations since in the United
States, unlike in France, there is no legal definition.
1. The American Legislation
There are numerous enactments directed at manipulation,
but we will only name the following:57
54. de Vauplane & Bornet, supra note 35, at 279.
55. S. Alamowitch, De la rumeur & la manipulation: la diffusion de fausses
information, MTF No. 74, Oct. 1995, at 13.
56. Thel, supra note 19, at 385.
57. In addition to the four cited provisions, there are other anti-manipulation
provisions in the following texts: sections 5(a) and 17(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1933, sections 15(b)(4)(E) and 17(a) of the Exchange Act of 1934. For a
global perspective of this regulation, see JOSEPH I. GOLDSTEIN, AN OVERVIEw OF
MARKET MANIPULATION: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS (PLI Securities Enforce-
ment Institute, 1990).
1997]
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
a. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act
This provision generally proscribes fraud and the dissem-
ination of inaccurate or inadequate information attending the
sale of securities.58 It covers both registered and unregistered
stocks. But it penalizes only fraudulent conduct on the part of
the seller. Though this article is not the most important in
combating manipulation, it lends precision to the notion: ma-
nipulation is broadened to encompass the dissemination of
false information.
b. Section 9 of the 1934 Exchange Act
Section 9(a)(1) to 9(a)(5) proscribe a series of practices that
have been declared manipulative by a congressional study
prior to the enactment of the Exchange Act. Application of
these sections are limited to securities registered on the na-
tional financial markets (NYSE and AMEX). 9 However, cases
have tended to extend its application to over-the-counter trans-
actions as well.60 Article 9(a)(1) proscribes the operation of
washed61 sales or matched orders." But these practices do not
constitute a violation unless they are committed with the in-
tent to create a false or misleading appearance of activity with
respect to a stock on the market. Article 9(a)(3), (4) and (5)
particularly proscribe certain practices where broker-dealers
and other persons sell, offer for sale, buy, or offer to buy regis-
tered securities.63 Article 9(a)(3) forbids these people from in-
ducing the sale or purchase of securities by spreading informa-
tion likely to give rise to hikes or drops in the values of these
securities subsequent to some manipulation, while article
9(a)(4) forbids anyone else from engaging in the same activities
for a consideration. Article 9(a)(4) also forbids these people
from inducing the purchase or sale of a stock by making false
or misleading statements. These provisions seek to eliminate
58. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695-700 (1980).
59. McLucas & Angotti, supra note 20, at 103.
60. In re Barett & Co., 9 S.E.C. 319, 328 (1941); see Martin A. Rogoff, Legal
Regulation of Over-The-Counter Market Manipulation: Critique and Proposal, 28
ME. L. REV. 149 (1976).
61. In re J.A. Latimer & Co., 38 S.E.C. 790, 792 (1958).
62. In re Thornton & Co., 28 S.E.C. 208, 209-10 (1948).
63. Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1164 (5th Cir,
1982).
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tipster sheets practices or touting (an aggressive promotion of
a stock using a spokesperson who has a financial interest in
the goal sought).
As one may observe, the spectrum of proscribed manipula-
tive activities is very broad. Nevertheless, they all have a com-
mon characteristic: they operate to distort the market and
artificially alter prices by appealing to the speculative impulses
of other investors. A more subtle form of manipulation consists
of using actual trading to give the impression of a bona-fide
trading activity. This practice involves either a conscious price
hike to create the impression of a rising demand for a given
stock at increasing prices, or a conscious drop in prices to cre-
ate the impression that more investors are selling as prices
drop. Article 9(a)(2) seeks to penalize this type of manipula-
tion, and more generally, every strategy used to convince the
public that the activity on a stock reflects authentic demand."
The key element, as we will later see, is the intent, since with-
out intent, manipulation could not be proved.
Finally, articles 9(b)-(d) allow the SEC to regulate every-
thing that relates to the acquisition, endorsement, or guaran-
tees of "puts," "calls," or other options.
Section 9 of the Exchange Act thus clearly distinguishes
between good and bad manipulation. In other words, it distin-
guishes between legitimate and illegitimate activities, inten-
tion being the criterion of distinction.
c. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Exchange Act
Section 10(b) is by far the best known and the most impor-
tant anti-manipulation provision." It proscribes the use of ma-
nipulative or misleading means or strategies with respect to
the purchase or sale of securities. Unlike article 9, article 10(b)
and subsequent rules apply to all stocks (with a few excep-
tions) in financial or over-the-counter (e.g., NASDAQ) markets.
Moreover, the provision itself adapts to all forms of manipula-
tion since the SEC is vested with the power to regulate all
64. Ray v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 624 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. Ga. 1984);
SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., 362 F. Supp. 964, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
65. Norman S. Poser, Stock Market Manipulation and Corporate Control
Transactions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 671 (1986).
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"new means of manipulation or deception."" Article 10(b) del-
egates discretionary powers to the Commission, which uses
these powers to codify transactions that are more likely to be
subject to manipulation, namely transactions made during the
selling period (Rules 10b-2 to 10b-21). Under this provision, it
is illegal for anyone, directly or indirectly:
* to use any means, strategies or tricks to defraud;
* to give any erroneous statement of a material fact, or
to omit a material fact thus rendering the statements
made misleading in light of the prevailing circum-
stances;
* to engage in any act, practice, or professional activity,
that is fraudulent or misleading to anyone connected
with the sale or purchase of securities.
The essential elements are thus, deception, inaccurate
statements, or omissions that lead to an imbalance in the in-
formation, which underlies the interplay of supply and de-
mand.
d. Section 15(c) of the Exchange Act
In addition to the above-named articles, section 15(c) regu-
lates broker-dealer activities by forbidding them to engage in
any manipulation or stabilization.67 Transactions which, with-
out any reason, induce the client to intervene on the market
are proscribed. So is scalping (where a broker-dealer buys ti-
tles before recommending them to his client with the goal of
reselling them when prices rise) and parking (a practice where
a stockholder fails to disclose his owner status and sells stocks
with the complicity of an intermediary with a promise to rebuy
them).
Finally, the SEC promulgated a regulation with the view
toward exercising better control over broker-dealer activities on
penny stocks (stocks transacted over-the-counter at a rate that
is less than one dollar per action)" and "pink sheets" (a stock
other than NASDAQ transacted over-the-counter and featured
66. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976).
67. Clearly v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-6 (1996); see Anthony De Toro, Market Manipulation
of Penny Stocks, 17 SEC. REG. L.J. 241 (1989); Joseph I. Goldstein & L. Delane
Cox, Penny Stock Markups and Markdowns, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 676 (1991).
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on a list published daily by the National Quotation Bureau). 9
2. The French Legislation
The French legislation has only two enactments: article
10-(3) of the 1967 Order, and the COB Regulation 90-04.
It is important to note that before the 1996 reform, the
essential element of the infraction was intention. The material
element consisted of a maneuver that featured two apparently
cumulative conditions: to disrupt the normal functioning of the
market, and to deceive investors.
The penal enactment was subjective. However, a COB
violation was originally objective since no intention was re-
quired. Neither manipulation nor maneuver is an issue in a
COB violation: in fact, the text enunciates the principle of free
interplay of supply and demand in stock markets (article 2). It
then refers to impediments to the issuance of stocks and the
inducement of others into error. Through this perspective,
which is more economic than moral, it penalizes nefarious
conduct rather than bad action. It is not concerned with bad
faith. Rather, its focus is on the undesirable end-result of the
action and its consequences.7" In this respect, it is closer to
the spirit of the American legislation. Finally, deontological
rules require the financial intermediary to respect the trans-
parency and security of the market by refraining from all ma-
nipulation (with respect to the market or his clients).7
3. Definition of Manipulation in Both Countries
In France, punishable manipulation consists of a maneu-
ver exercised on the market with a view to impair its proper
functioning by inducing others into error. Consequently, mar-
69. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (1996).
70. See Graslin/COB, Bull. COB No. 288, Feb. 1995, at 21, where the Com-
mission penalized a stock manager for using a negotiation record for discontinued
bids as a "purchase/sold" slip for the purpose of eliciting quotations at pre-deter-
mined prices thereby preventing the stocks in question from being subject to the
free confrontation of purchases and sales. Chron. financire et bouri-re, BANQUE ET
DRorr, No. 42, July-Aug. 1995, at 29 chron. F. Peltier.
71. F. P~rier, Abr~gj de diontologie des activit&s financiares, REVUE DE DROIT
BANCAIRE ET DE LA BOURSE, No. 18, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 58; F. P6rier, La
diontologie des activit~s financieres; RAPPORT MORAL SUR L'ARGENT DANS LE
MONDE (Association d'6conomie financi~re, P.U. eds., 1994).
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ket disruption results from the investors' mistakes, which are
brought about by the manipulators. The term "maneuver,"
which replaced the word "action" in article 419 of the Penal
Code, covers bids or machinations made with the goal of caus-
ing artificial hikes or drops in stock values.72 This change in
terminology allows for a better distinction of non-reprehensible
practices by underscoring the organized nature of the operation
that underlies the infraction.73 This term "maneuver," al-
though less neutral than "action," still allows for different
interpretations. It suggests either some dealings to mislead, a
practice closer to the "dol," or some external material act done
to support and inspire confidence into some false statement, a
practice closer to fraud. Until the Law of July 2, 1996, it was a
commission infraction which required proof of an intent to
alter prices. This then raises some questions about the impor-
tance of leaving out the term "knowingly" from article 10-3.
In the United States, a definition of manipulation can only
be inferred from the cases and a study of the doctrine. The Su-
preme Court held that manipulation generally referred to
"practices like simultaneous sales, matched orders, price hikes
or drops with a view to mislead investors by artificially in-
duced market activity."74 In other words, manipulation pre-
sumes an intent to deceive investors by artificially controlling
stock prices.75 Thus, every artificial interference that alters
the free functioning of the market constitutes manipulation.76
This process is thus the reverse of what obtains in France: the
goal is not to disrupt the market by inducing others into error,
but to defraud another by affecting the market. The result is
nevertheless the same: defrauded investors and a disrupted
market. This definition sets two limits: first, it distinguishes
manipulation from other practices proscribed by section 9(a);
and second, deception seems to be an essential element.77 A Su-
72. Rapport Auberger, Doc. Ass. Nat., 1987-1988, No. 1159, at 113.
73. J. Saint Geours, La COB face & la manipulation de cours, RAPPORT MORAL
SUR L'ARGENT DANS LE MONDE (P.A.U. ed., 1995).
74. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977).
75. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
76. Pin v. Texaco, 793 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1986); Kadiman v. Ladish
Co., 792 F.2d 614, 627 (7th Cir. 1986); Ray v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 624
F. Supp. 301, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Trane Co. v. O'Connor See., 561 F. Supp. 301,
304 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), cited in De Toro, supra note 68, at n.43.
77. Poser, supra note 65, at 671.
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preme Court decision confirmed this by holding that there
cannot be manipulation without misrepresentation, i.e., inaccu-
rate statements or nondisclosure of material facts.78 The doc-
trine itself proposes other definitions. 9 For some, manipula-
tion is conduct aimed at either inducing others to transact in a
stock, or to force the price of a variable stock to an artificial
level.8" Others define it as a deliberate interference with the
free interplay of supply and demand in the stock market. Fi-
nally, some others who find all these definitions unsatisfactory
wonder: when can it be said that prices are not real but artifi-
cial? What is an interference? How do we define an induce-
ment to transact in a stock? Is it not possible to encourage an
investor to intervene in the market without necessarily seeking
to defraud? In fact, in an interesting article, two economics
professors try to demonstrate the inadequacy of the above-cited
definitions.8' The first criterion must be rejected. Otherwise
every act that induces investors to act will qualify as manipu-
lation, and it would be enough that the investor be induced to
act without a specific goal. The second criterion cannot be
retained either, since it is impossible to distinguish a normal
price from an artificial one. Finally, the third criterion is also
useless since interference is not definite and presupposes a
distinction between a legitimate and an illegitimate demand.
Under these circumstances, the only acceptable definition is
one whose foundation lies in the manipulator's bad intent.
III. THE CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF THE INFRACTION OF
STOCK MANIPULATION
It is not enough to define manipulation; one also needs to
know the constituent elements of the infraction since manipu-
lation per se is not punishable.
78. Schreiber v. Burlington N. Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985), cited in Poser, supra
note 65, at 671.
79. The concept of manipulation was studied in depth by Judge F.H.
Easterbrook, in Monopoly, Manipulation and the Regulation of Futures Markets, 59
J. Bus. S. 103 (1986).
80. Thel, supra note 19, at 393.
81. Fischel & Ross, supra note 51, at 507.
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A. The Market
Though strictly speaking a market is not a constituent
element, it is at least a condition precedent. In both countries,
the scope of anti-manipulation legislation is voluntarily broad.
Article 10-3 of the 1967 Order, just like the COB regulation,
refers to the market, a scope that is broader than the stock
market. As is the case with insider trading, it is proper to
inquire into the impact of this enactment on over-the-counter
transactions. The COB and the courts have extended the provi-
sions for insider violations to OTC markets.82 As surprising as
it may seem, it is very likely under the circumstances that the
same solution applies to securities manipulation. In an unregu-
lated market, stocks are not subject to rules that limit their
variation; consequently it is hard to determine whether a vari-
ation is normal or results from manipulation. However, there
is the possibility that the omission, in the Law of July 2, 1996,
of any reference to "the market" with respect to insider trad-
ing, considerably broadens the possibility of incrimination.
This omission may lead to the assumption that the infraction
exists independently of the market where it took place.8" Some
doubt, therefore, may be entertained as to the import of this
legislation. The new financial law having clearly distinguished
between regulated markets and over-the-counter markets,
would it not have been preferable to maintain the reference to
"the market," which in fact could have covered both types of
markets? One must inquire then into the meaning of the word
market, since it was left out of the insider infraction, but re-
tained in the definition of securities manipulation.
In the United States, sections 9 and 10 of the Exchange
Act apply to both official and over-the-counter markets. And
like in France, this regulation covers everyone who intervenes
on the market.
82. Paris, Nov. 15, 1994, Bull. Joly bourse 1995, § 2, at 9 note Hubert de
Vauplane. As to unregistered markets, article 1 of rule 90-04 expressly extends its
reach to its operations.
83. Compte rendu analytique officiel, No. 66, jeudi Mar. 14, 1996, at 190,
intervention Jolibois.
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B. Paramount Importance of the Intent Element
On either side of the Atlantic, the existence of a material
element is necessary to characterize manipulation.
In France, under article 10-3 of the 1967 Order, the mate-
rial element consists of a maneuver exerted on the market for
the purpose of impairing its regular functioning by inducing
others into error. A single lie therefore should not be enough to
characterize the infraction. This is so in order to distinguish it
from fraud. Nevertheless, the distinction remains unclear since
according to the COB, an action on the market is characterized
as fraudulent.' Moreover, the maneuver must be exercised on
the market. In other words, it is a financial operation, exclu-
sive of maneuvers effectuated outside the market (e.g., press
campaign or dissemination of rumors).
It is also noteworthy that manipulation is a formal infrac-
tion since it is defined with respect to its object rather than its
effect. It is therefore unnecessary to establish the causal link
between the incriminated conduct and the result. It is irrele-
vant that the goal was not reached if the goal is questionable.
However, even though the infraction is formal, a mere attempt
remains punishable.
We must now define the term maneuver. This task is
made more difficult because there are just a few decisions on
the subject. We should note, however, that market disruption
is caused by the transactions of those who have been misled,
not by the maneuver itself. This exigency makes it possible to
separate the infraction from other practices that are necessary
for the maintenance of the stock. Thus, transactions of stock
stabilization when a control block is discontinued do not meet
the criteria laid down by article 10-3. When an operation is
carried out in broad daylight with full disclosure, it cannot be
a maneuver.
85
In the rare decisions involving securities manipulation,
one must distinguish the cases dealing with the "boiler" tech-
nique which courts have likened to manipulation.86 In fact this
technique constitutes both a manipulation and a fraud.87
84. 22d Rapport COB, Bull. July 1990, § 168, No. 23, at 616.
85. T.G.I. Paris, Mar. 5, 1993, RJDA 10/93, No. 813, BANQUE ET DROIT, No.
31, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 23 note F. Peltier.
86. See cases cited supra note 23.
87. This technique consists of manipulation that raises the price of a stock
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Regulation 90-04 was instituted to mitigate the difficulties
associated with the constituent elements of the infraction.
These elements are different from those in article 10-03. The
term maneuver is not used, and two distinct facts constitute
the infraction: bids that induce others into error, or bids that
impair the pricing mechanism. While article 10-03 considers
these two elements as inseparable components of the material
element of the infraction, the COB regulation separates them
into two distinct dealings, each being independently reprehen-
sible. Despite this flexibility, the rule gave rise to only two
decisions.' However, the text allows the COB to prosecute
several cases. It may penalize every bid that did not respect
market rules and it may prosecute open bidders in markets
where such bids are not authorized or people are acting with-
out qualification. Finally, it may also penalize perpetrators of
passive manipulation, i.e., those who refrain from bidding
when their previous position requires them to bid.
In the United States, the material element of the infrac-
tion is particularly important. The criteria differ according to
which article is invoked as the basis of the prosecution. While
section 9(a)(1) gives a clear description of the material element,
sections 9(a)(2) and 10(b) are less precise since they seek to
apprehend the largest number of manipulative practices. The
material element in 9(a)(1) is particularly precise since it tar-
gets washed sales (transactions where the parties agree that
title will not pass) and matched orders (where A buys 100
shares knowing that B is simultaneously selling 100 shares at
the same price and with the knowledge that A is buying them),
both of which create the deceptive appearance of activity in the
market (note that such practices are not proscribed in
France).89 Section 9(a)(2), initially designed to combat pools (a
syndicate of investors who combine efforts to manipulate secu-
rities or commodities)," has a material element of greater
whose market is narrow and sensitive by making a large number of bids with the
goal of persuading investors of the imminence of a transaction, thus causing them
to deal in the stock. The manipulator then sells at the higher values.
88. Computel, ICPU, Bull. COB 1992, No. 263; Graslin, Bull. COB No. 288,
Feb. 1995, at 17; BANQuE ET DROIT, No. 42, July-Aug. 1995, at 29 chron. F.
Peltier.
89. Lewis D. Lowenfels, Sections 9(a)(1) and 9(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934: An Analysis of Two Important Anti-Manipulative Provisions Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 698 (1991).
90. Comment, Market Manipulation and the Securities Exchange Act, 46 YALE
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scope because it proscribes a large number of manipulative
practices.9' Three elements must be present to establish a
violation of article 9(a)(2): (1) a series of transactions on a
stock quoted on a national stock market, (2) which leads, as
the result of some action on the stock, to a hike or a drop in its
price, (3) done with the goal to induce others to purchase or
sell (the last condition will be developed in the next para-
graph). The first condition should normally be restricted to
purchases or sales actually made, but the SEC extended it to
bids. The expression series of transactions is expansively con-
strued; thus, 3 purchases in 2 consecutive days constitute a
series of transactions. 92 The infraction covers direct and indi-
rect transactions as well as those carried out on one's own
behalf or on behalf of others. The second element accounts for
the impact of manipulation. There are two possible distinct
consequences: either the creation of some activity on some
stock, or a hike or drop in its price. Actual activity may be
created, for example, by having a party buy the stocks and
resell them to the defendant. However, the law does not pro-
scribe every activity that may lead to a hike or a drop in stock
prices; only those that seek to create artificial movement. Fi-
nally, factors such as domination and control of a stock's mar-
ket, or its collapse when the manipulator ceases his activities,
may adversely affect stock prices.
Thus the material element in section 9 is much more pre-
cise than the one in article 10-3. Moreover, in article 10b, the
SEC laid down very broad rules. So did the COB in France in
Rule No. 90-04 of article 10b-5. The purpose of this provision is
to protect investors and promote a free and open stock market
as well as ensure fair practices in the market.93 This article
applies to both sales and purchases of stocks. Because of its
broad scope, (registered and unregistered stocks), practices
that violate section 9 also violate article 10(b)(5). But the latter
proscribes many more practices, since unlike 9(a)(2), it does
L.J. 624 (1937). For an excellent description of a pool, see LOSS & SELIGMAN,
supra note 9, ch. 10, at 3941.
91. Normally restricted to the stock market, the scope of section 9 was broad-
ened in In re Wright to encompass OTC markets. In re Wright, 3 S.E.C. 190, 213
(1938), cited in Lowenfels, supra note 89, at 698.
92. In re Kidder Peabody & Co., 18 S.E.C. 559 (1945).
93. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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not require that the questionable transaction be made with the
purpose of inducing others into error. However, a good faith
investment that incidentally affects prices is not proscribed. 4
The Supreme Court adopted a narrow construction of the term
manipulation in article 10(b)(5). In fact, Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder and Santa-Fe Industries Inc. v. Green both stand
for the proposition that there cannot be manipulation without
misrepresentation or nondisclosure. 5 The court also stated
that failure to disclose manipulation constituted a violation of
rule 10b-5.9" Thus, the SEC can no longer penalize manipula-
tive practices that are not deceptive.9" The appropriateness of
this position is subject to vigorous doctrinal debate. Some be-
lieve that the expansive interpretation of article 10(b) adopted
by the SEC is more consistent with congressional intent, while
others align themselves with the restrictive interpretation of
the Supreme Court.
However, irrespective of the legislation, one cannot under-
stand the material element without considering the moral
element.
C. The Moral Element: Key to the Problem?
In France, the use of the term "knowingly" in article 10-3
of the 1967 Order indicates that the infraction could only be
committed when acting in bad faith. The operator must have
intended to impair the free functioning of the market.98 The
moral element was therefore essential. But since it was diffi-
cult to prove, prosecutions based on article 10-3 were rare. The
requirement of an intent to disrupt the market was, in our
opinion, the source of the ineffectiveness of this provision. In
this respect, it is notable that rule 90-04 does not refer to any
moral element, a fact which led some to suggest that the COB
sought the "devitalization" of the infraction of securities ma-
nipulation.99 Note also that the COB adopts an objective and
94. United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 349 (9th Cir. 1976), cited in
McLucas & Angotti, supra note 20, at 103.
95. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Santa Fe Industries v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
96. Charnay, 537 F.2d at 349, cited in McLucas & Angotti, supra note 20, at
103.
97. Schreiber v. Burlington N. Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
98. Cass. crim., July 2, 1942, at 178.
99. A. Viandier & M. Jeantin, REVUE DE DRorr BANcAmE ET DE LA BOURSE,
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teleological interpretation of manipulation in order to escape
the burden of proof imposed by article 10-3. In light of the
reform effectuated by the Law of July 2, 1996, which leaves
out the word "knowingly," must we now categorize the infrac-
tion of securities manipulation as a material infraction? Note
that the test criminalizes a maneuver whose object is, rather
than one whose effect is, the impairment of the regular func-
tioning of the market. This would tend to suggest that securi-
ties manipulation was not necessarily transformed into a non-
intentional infraction.
In the United States, section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act
requires proof that the litigious transactions were made for the
purpose of inducing the sale or purchase of a stock."0 This,
however, does not mean that a criminal or evil intent is re-
quired in order to violate this provision. In fact, proof of fraud
is not even required.'0 ' Courts have held that certain practices
establish this manipulative intent, such as always making
transactions at the beginning or close of sessions, or buying
from a financial market and reselling over-the-counter. More-
over, this intent, which is even more important because it
allows for a distinction between legitimate activity and manip-
ulation, depends on the surrounding facts.0 2
Unlike the preceding provision, section 10(b) and rule 10b-
5 do not require proof of an intent to induce another to engage
in a stock transaction. Nevertheless, scienter (defined by the
courts as a mental state comprising an intention to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud) must be proved.' Absent a Supreme
Court decision on the subject, courts have tended to agree that
mere negligence will not suffice. As is the case with intent,
scienter may be indirect and can be proved by circumstantial
evidence. Finally, failure to disclose manipulation is a violation
of these articles; in fact, failure to disclose that prices are arti-
ficially affected corresponds to deception or omission of materi-
al facts.
No. 21, Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 204.
100. Poser, supra note 65, at 671.
101. Lowenfels, supra note 89, at 698; accord Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air
Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 795 (2d Cir. 1969), cited in McLucas & Angotti, supra
note 20.
102. Comment, supra note 90, at 624. For a study of some judicial decisions,
see McLucas & Angotti, supra note 20.
103. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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Note that the moral element is closely linked to the mate-
rial element, and this is a result of the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation. Thus, through an interpretation of the material
element limited to deceptive fraudulent activities and by re-
quiring proof of an intent to deceive or defraud, the Supreme
Court considerably reduced the scope of manipulation. Conse-
quently, the investor who cannot prove deception will not be
entitled to damages. Faced with this situation, the Supreme
Court and the SEC define deception as a very flexible con-
cept.10
4
D. Materiality and Reliance
When a stock has been manipulated, securities law grants
the victim a right to restitution.
In France, one must join the penal prosecution as a civil
party under article 10-3 of the 1967 Order. However, the inves-
tor need not prove, in addition to manipulation, that he would
not have become involved had he had knowledge of the facts.
In the United States, on the other hand, in addition to the
moral element of intent, one must prove materiality and reli-
ance, both of which are the principal elements of the cause of
action. °5 Although section 9(e) of the Exchange Act expressly
provides for damages, section 10(b) does not. It was not until
1971 that the Supreme Court finally recognized an implicit
private right of action under article 10(b)(5). And although the
Court tried to limit its application, there is an increasing num-
ber of actions based on this cause of action.
For the action to be allowed, the victim must have either
purchased or sold the manipulated stock. He must also prove
scienter, materiality, and reliance. The test for materiality is
whether a reasonable person would attach some importance to
the distorted facts in his decision to engage in the transaction
in question. Information thus plays a capital role in this re-
spect since there are instances where the misinformation or
nondisclosure may be considered material. Failure to disclose a
reimbursement negotiation plan with respect to the plaintiffs
104. Lawrence Damian McCabe, Puppet Masters or Marionettes: Is Program
Trading Manipulative as Defined by The Securities Exchange Act of 1934?, 61
FORDHAm.L. REV. S207 (1993).
105. 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIEs REGULATION
§ 13.5, at 86 (1990).
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stock is deemed immaterial. On the other hand, a substantial
reduction in dividends is considered material. Reliance is a
corollary of materiality: the test is how the plaintiff would
have acted had he had knowledge of the real facts. In other
words, it must be established that he was actually induced in
error. In light of the difficulty of proving reliance, courts have
allowed a presumption of reliance which gave rise to the fraud-
on-the-market doctrine.' Under this doctrine, as we ex-
plained in the first part, it is enough, to show reliance, that
market prices have been affected by the false statement or the
nondisclosure, and that the plaintiff's loss was due to the sale
or purchase of the stock at the fraudulent prices.
E. Examples of Manipulation
The foregoing illustrates how complex and ambiguous the
concept of manipulation is. Nevertheless, there is abundant
jurisprudence on the subject. And although we may not provide
an exhaustive list here, it might be interesting to name some
examples of manipulative practices.
First of all, the best known is the boiler practice: a stock
whose market is narrow and sensitive is manipulated rapidly
to increase its price by making over-the-counter bids with the
goal of persuading investors of the imminence of some opera-
tion. While investors contemplate an eventual price hike, the
manipulator quickly sells his holdings, pocketing substantial
profits in the process. It is also possible to arrange for the
seller to announce a reasonable drop in dividends, which will
then lead to a drop in the price of the stock, thus causing mi-
nority stockholders to sell at undervalued prices."7 In cases of
merger, it is possible to artificially raise the stock price of one
of the companies for better merger parity.' Investors also use
the "marking the close" technique where bids are made at the
close of sessions. Since such bids are generally used to calcu-
late the stock's variation for the next day's session, any ac-
tion on the stock creates the appearance of a hike or drop in its
106. Note, The Fraud-On-The-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143 (1982); De
Simone, supra note 42, at S151; Macey & Muller, supra note 43, at 1059.
107. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
108. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d. Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975).
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market. 9 Over-the-counter markets are particularly sensi-
tive to these types of practices."0 Finally, questions have been
raised about the validity of two peculiar types of financial
practices: transactions on substantial blocks of stocks and pro-
gram trading. With respect to the first, studies have shown
that prices may be disturbed by this type of practice.' With
respect to program trading, a recent study indicates that the
practice may be manipulative or not, depending on whether
one relies on the legislature's session notes or the Supreme
Court's decision.'
IV. EFFECTiVENESS OF THE PROHIBITION
The uncertainty attending the definition of securities ma-
nipulation and the difficulty in applying it raises some doubt
as to its effectiveness and elicits suggestions that the infraction
should be canceled (A). Moreover, on either side of the Atlantic,
it has become apparent that damages are difficult to establish
(B).
A. A Controversial Proscription
Some economists have proposed the elimination of any
regulation that penalizes securities manipulation. 3 Noting
that there is no definition for manipulation, they conclude that
manipulation is impossible. In fact, these economists contend
that the requisite conditions must be met simultaneously in
order to give rise to manipulation: the action on the market
must lead to a price increase, and the manipulator must be
able to sell at a higher price than the price at which he bought
the stock. For manipulation to succeed, the manipulator must
give the impression that he has or will obtain some informa-
tion on the stock. But prices cannot be affected this way be-
cause of the flexibility of supply and demand and the substitu-
109. United States v. Jefferies, 87 Cr. (MEL) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1987); United
States v. GAF Corp., 88 Cr. 415 (MJL) (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 1988); SEC v. ZICO
Investments Holdings, Inc., 87 Civ. 8487 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1987), cited in
McLucas & Angotti, supra note 20.
110. Rogoff, supra note 60, at 147.
111. R.W. Holthausen & R.W. Leftwich, The Effect of Large Block Transactions
on Security Prices, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 237 (1993).
112. McCabe, supra note 104, at S207.
113. Fischel & Ross, supra note 51, at 503.
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tion that takes place. Moreover, if the manipulator seeks to
convince someone that the information in his possession will
lead to a price increase, it is very likely that the increase he is
peddling derives simultaneously from the stock that he bought,
in which case his profit is naught. Furthermore, the eventual
manipulator may be faced with a liquidity problem that gener-
ates higher costs: because he wishes to purchase large blocks
of stocks in order to raise prices, there may not be enough
sellers to meet his demand. Consequently, the manipulator
may buy at a higher price than the price at which he will even-
tually sell. Thus, since manipulation cannot be successfully
carried out, it is described as self-deterring.
To this impossible manipulation theory, the authors add
the difficulty in identifying the practice, which results from the
fact that the intention of the supposed manipulator is hard to
determine. They deplore the fact that the law relies on objec-
tive facts to deduce bad intent. In other words, they deplore
the fact that the law assimilates manipulative practices with
conduct that has nothing to do with securities manipulation. A
good example is when transactions are made before closing.
These transactions are generally likened to manipulation be-
cause closing prices are deeply affected by last minute bids.
But exchange rates are generally higher at the end of the day.
Why then consider bids made before closing as manipulative?
This opinion has aroused strong reactions to the effect that
even if manipulation is hard to discern, the irregular bidding
may disrupt the normal pricing of a stock."4
In addition to disagreeing with the appropriateness of
repressing securities manipulation, the doctrine also questions
the evaluation of the resulting damages to the extent that the
methods adopted by courts contravene economic theory.
B. Damages Are Difficult to Estimate
One of the difficulties raised by manipulative practices is
the evaluation of damages.
In the United States, economic theory plays an increasing-
ly important role in the process since it serves as the basis for
calculating the manipulator's profits and the losses incurred
114. Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes-The Mechanics of Securities Manipu-
lation, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 219 (1994).
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by the deceived investor. Some jurisdictions will terminate the
contract. As a general rule, however, courts will impose out-of-
pocket damages on account of the implied private right of ac-
tion under article 10(b)(5). The difficulty of this approach re-
sides in the computation of interest that accrued on the dam-
ages since this interest is based on the value of the stock at
the time of the fraudulently induced purchase or sale. General-
ly, to compute these damages, American courts adopt the posi-
tion that the price of a stock just before the discovery of the
fraud reflects its price. Thus, it is appropriate to extrapolate
the stock's value in time for every day that the deception
remained undiscovered. Multiplying this difference by the
number of stocks purchased or sold will give the amount of the
damages. Some studies have suggested that this method of
computing damages is not pertinent, especially when there are
intervening external factors, like a crash, for example.'15 With-
out going into the details of these studies, they suggest essen-
tially that the correct estimation of damages should wait for a
few days after the discovery of the fraud to allow the stock to
regain a more realistic value and thus minimize the effect of
the crash.
In France, there is no jurisprudence on the subject with
respect to the infraction of securities manipulation. However,
the solution adopted with respect to the infraction of dissemi-
nation of false information is instructive. The Cassation court
held that damages incurred by stockholders subsequent to
dissemination of false information is equal to the difference
between the normal value of a stock and its value after the
dissemination of the information."' This solution, which seems
logical if the damages may be presumed to be definite, is none-
theless criticized. Some have argued that it is harsh when
applied to stocks purchased prior to the period under litiga-
tion."7 This solution may also be criticized for not taking into
115. Lev & de Villiers, supra note 41, at 7.
116. Cass Crim. Mar. 15, 1993, Bull. No. 113, at 280; Paris Dec. 18, 1995,
BANQUE ET DROrr, No. 48, July-Aug. 1996, F. Peltier & H. de Vauplane, chron.
Note that COB administrative penalties for a Rule 90-02 violation relative to pub-
lic information do not take into account the damages to the stockholders. The
violation does not seek to compensate for the damages, but rather to punish the
dissemination of inaccurate and untrue information.
117. Chambre commerciale et financibre [Cass. com.], Mar. 15, 1993, Bull. Joly
bourse, July-Aug. 1993, § 76, at 365 note M. Jeantin; REV. SOCIETES, 1993, at 847
238 [Vol. XXII:I
SECURITIES MANIPULATION
consideration the possible effect of a crash.
C. Toward a Reform?
Between unbridled liberalism and excessive punishment,
is it not appropriate just to attempt to improve on existing
provisions?
In the United States, the legislation seems particularly
effective. However, it is necessary that the SEC and the Su-
preme Court agree over a single definition of manipulation. It
is also necessary to combat manipulation more vigorously in
markets such as OTC." 8 However, the approaches to achieving
these ends are split. Some have proposed a reform of article
10(b)(5) in light of the Supreme Court's position with respect
to an implied right of action."' Others believe that the best
quality of article 10(b)(5) is its adaptability. 2 ' This provision
is key to the American legislation. Thanks to its flexibility, it
can adapt to evolving market techniques.
In France, despite the reform effected by the Law of July
2, 1996, the offense of securities manipulation remains useless.
On one hand, its application is hindered by the moral element
requirement, and on the other hand, it cannot, absent the
incorporation of the fraud-on-the-market theory, address the
effects on the free interplay of supply and demand. When a
rule is ineffective, one may either make it more effective or one
may discard it. If we opt for the first solution, we must admit,
as is the case with insider infractions, that an infraction may
be committed without requiring a culpable intent. In this case,
the infraction is devoid of its essence, and the position is con-
sistent with Lombroso's theory which purports that society is
a body that must be rid of all cancerous cells, in other words,
of every individual susceptible of deviant behavior. The second
method seems more appropriate: the infraction has no real
basis in law since it is a mere economic infraction without any
note B. Bouloc; see also H. Hovasse's notes, DR. SOCIETES, Sept. 1992, No. 14.
118. Rogoff, supra note 60, at 149.
119. David S. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of
Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U. L. REv. 627 (1963); Adam F. Ingber, 10b-5 or Not
10b-5: Are the Current Efforts to Reform Securities Litigation Misguided?, 61
FoRDHAM L. REV. S351 (1993).
120. Donald C. Langevoort, Rule 10b-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM
L. REV. S7 (1993).
1997] 239
BROOK. J. INTL L.
moral component-it is more appropriate to substitute it with
an administrative penalty. Under these conditions, it is prefer-
able to empower an independent administrative body like the
COB, which can adapt to changes in the market and modify its
rules as quickly as the techniques change, with jurisdiction
over the matter. Discarding the infraction and allowing the
COB regulation to prevail presents another advantage: on one
hand it will eliminate the duality of penalty and repressive
authorities, and on the other hand, it will prevent dual penal
and administrative prosecutions for the same case. Obviously,
such evolution must be accompanied by a reinforcement of
defense rights.
However, the legislature did not adopt this solution. In-
stead it opted to maintain the penal infraction but reduced its
moral element to the barest minimum. Our skepticism as to
the use of keeping a dual penalty, one administrative and the
other penal, remains justified.
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